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ABSTRACT
Despite considerable controversy surrounding the use of state lotteries as a means of public
finance, little is known about their consumer consequences. This project investigates two central
questions about lotteries. First, do state lotteries primarily crowd out other forms of gambling, or do they
crowd out non-gambling consumption? Second, does consumer demand for lottery games respond to
expected returns, as maximizing behavior predicts, or do consumers appear to be misinformed about the
risks and returns of lottery gambles? Analyses of multiple sources of micro-level gambling data
demonstrate that lottery spending does not  substitute for other forms of gambling. Household
consumption data suggest that household lottery gambling crowds out approximately $38 per month, or
two percent, of other household consumption, with larger proportional reductions among low-income
households. Demand for lottery products responds positively to the expected value of the gamble,
controlling for other moments of the gamble and product characteristics; this suggests that consumers of









 In the past three decades, the prevalence and scale of state lotteries have expanded dramatically. 
The first modern state lottery was introduced in New Hampshire in 1964. By 1973, seven states 
operated state lotteries and consumers spent a total of $2.1 billion on lottery products (in year 
2000 dollars).
1 By 1999, there were 38 state lotteries in operation, and consumers spent a total of 
$37 billion. This total represents an annual average of $226 per adult living in a lottery state, or 
$370 per household nationwide. This is more than the average household spent in 1999 on 
alcoholic beverages or on tobacco products and supplies. It is more than twice the amount 
households spent on reading materials. And it is roughly equal to what the average household 
spent on life and other personal insurance.
2  
As the expansion of state lotteries continues, there is substantial public controversy 
surrounding the use of lotteries as a means of raising public funds. Opponents argue that state 
lotteries prey on minorities and the poor and that spending on state lotteries displaces 
consumption and savings. Some worry that governments are “tricking” people with a “sucker’s 
bet,” exploiting misinformation on the part of consumers.
3 Supporters of state lotteries counter 
that people from all demographic groups play the lottery. They argue that people demand 
gambling products and a state lottery capitalizes on that demand by providing a product that 
substitutes for other forms of gambling. Some characterize lottery sales as voluntary purchases of 
entertainment goods.  
Despite the controversy, there is virtually no empirical research into the validity of the 
claims on either side of the debate. This paper fills that gap by addressing two central questions. 
First, do lotteries simply crowd out other gambling expenditures, or does the presence of a state 
lottery lead to a reduction in other forms of household spending? Second, does consumer 
demand for lottery games respond to expected returns, as maximizing behavior predicts, or do 
consumers appear to be misinformed about the risks and returns of lottery gambles?  
                                                           
1 Clotfelter et al. (1999), p. 100. Their figures are in year 1997 dollars.  
2 United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (2001), Table A.  
3 To cite two opponents: "In fact, state lotteries ... are mechanisms by which the state seduces its citizens with the 
promise of riches, suckering them into gambling away their income and their unemployment checks on games that 
offer an almost infinitesimal chance of winning big." Robyn Gearey in The New Republic, May 1997; "The lottery 
may seem like ‘funny money’, but it is in effect taxation, taken through a con-trick." The Economist, Nov 18, 2000, 
on Britain’s National Lottery.   3
The paper first investigates how household gambling behavior responds to the 
introduction of a state lottery. I conduct two different analyses to answer this question. The first 
is an analysis of micro-level data on household gambling from confidential Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) - Diary Survey files from 1982 to 1998. 
During this time 21 states implemented a state lottery. I exploit the variation across states in the 
timing of state lottery introduction to compare the change in gambling expenditures among 
households in states that implement a lottery to the change among households in states that do 
not. The data demonstrate that total household gambling is increased after a state lottery is 
introduced, which implies that households are not completely financing lottery gambling by 
substituting away from other forms of gambling. A complementary analysis looks at data on 
adult gambling behavior from two national surveys, a 1998 survey conducted by the National 
Opinion Research Council (NORC) and a 1975 survey conducted by researchers at the 
University of Michigan. These data confirm that adults do not reduce their participation in 
previously-existing forms of gambling after a state lottery is introduced.  
If consumers respond to the presence of a state lottery with new gambling, then they must 
substitute away from other consumption. I analyze BLS CEX - Interview Survey data from 1984 
to 1998 to investigate to what extent this is true. I exploit the variation across states in the timing 
of state lottery introduction to compare the change in household expenditures among households 
in states that implement a lottery to the change among households in states that do not. The 
analysis finds that household spending on lottery tickets is financed completely by a reduction in 
non-gambling consumption. The introduction of a state lottery is associated with a decline of 
$115 per quarter in household non-gambling consumption. This figure implies a monthly 
reduction of $23 in per-adult consumption, which compares to average monthly sales of $18 per 
lottery-state adult. The response is most pronounced for low-income households, which on 
average reduce non-gambling consumption by three percent. Among households in the lowest 
income third of the CEX sample, the data demonstrate a statistically significant reduction in 
expenditures on food eaten in the home (3.1 percent) and on home mortgage, rent, and other bills 
(6.9 percent).  
The final analysis of the paper is an evaluation of whether lottery consumers appear to be 
making informed choices. The answer to this question is important to determining whether the 
shift in household consumption is consumer-welfare enhancing. Lottery gambling is part   4
investment, as consumers are making choices over risky assets, and it is part entertainment. 
Assuming that the entertainment and pecuniary components of the lottery gamble are separable, 
maximizing behavior predicts that consumer demand for lottery products should depend 
positively on its expected return, holding constant game characteristics. To evaluate whether this 
prediction holds, I analyze weekly sales and characteristics data from 91 lotto games from 1992 
to 1998. The analysis suggests that sales are positively driven by the expected value of a gamble, 
controlling for higher-order moments of the gamble and non-wealth creating characteristics. This 
finding is robust to alternative specifications, including controlling for unobserved product fixed 
effects. In addition, I find that consumers respond to non-wealth creating, “entertaining” game 
features. Together, these two findings suggest that consumers are at least partly – and potentially 
fully – informed, rational consumers. It is consistent with these findings to claim that consumers 
derive an entertainment equal to the price of the gamble (one minus expected value), and then, 
insofar as they are making investments, they are informed evaluators of gambles.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of state lotteries in the 
United States. It briefly discusses the history and operation of state lotteries and then presents 
micro-level evidence about lottery gambling. The section concludes with a theoretical discussion 
about the market for lottery products. Section 3 reviews related evidence. Section 4 discusses the 
impact of state lotteries on household expenditures, looking first at gambling behavior and then 
at household non-gambling consumption. Section 5 investigates consumer demand for lottery 
products as a function of game characteristics. And finally, section 6 provides concluding 
comments. 
 
2 State lotteries in the United States 
 
2.1 History and operation 
 
The state of New Hampshire ushered in the era of the modern lottery by introducing a state 
lottery in 1964.
4 Inspired by New Hampshire’s lead, New York and New Jersey soon introduced 
                                                           
4 Previously, lotteries played a role in raising money for such notable projects as Harvard College, the Continental 
Army, and public works undertakings throughout the Colonial period. A scandal involving the Louisiana Lottery in 
1894 led to the prohibition of lotteries for seven decades. See Clotfelter et al. (1999) for a more complete discussion 
of the history and operation of state lotteries.   5
their own state lotteries. Cross-border lottery sales place pressure on neighboring states to 
implement their own state lottery.
5 Accordingly, the spread of lotteries primarily followed a 
geographical pattern, spreading first across the Northeast, then to the West, and finally to the 
Midwest and South. By 1996, 37 states and the District of Columbia operated a state lottery. 
Appendix Table 1 lists implementation dates.  
In each case the state ended its former prohibition of lotteries and established a state 
agency as the sole provider of lottery products. All states use the profits from the state lottery 
operation as a source of revenue. Ten of the 38 state lotteries allocate lottery revenues to general 
funds; 16 earmark all or part of lottery revenues to education; and the remainder earmark for a 
wide variety of uses, some specific and others broad. On average, a dollar wagered on a state 
lottery game returns 33 cents of profit to the state. This profit can be likened to an excise tax 
levied at a certain rate on the purchases of a particular product. Assuming a five percent average 
state income tax, the implicit tax rate on state lotteries in 1997 was approximately 61 percent.
6 In 
spite of this, the lotteries’ contributions to state budgets are modest. In 1997, the contribution of 
state lottery funds to total own-source general revenues ranged between .41 percent in New 
Mexico to 4.07 percent in Georgia.
7 
 
2.2 Lottery gambling: micro-level evidence 
 
Consumer spending on state lottery products in 1999 totaled $37 billion in year 2000 dollars. The 
2000 National Gaming Survey reports that 72 percent of American adults purchased some kind 
of lottery product during the year, 28 percent played at least once a week, and 14 percent played 
more than once a week.  
                                                           
5 This explanation finds empirical support in Berry and Berry (1990), which finds that the probability that a state 
will adopt a lottery increases in the number of its neighbors that have previously adopted lotteries even controlling 
for internal characteristics. There is anecdotal support as well. Both Governor Don Siegelman of Alabama and 
Governor Jim Hodges of South Carolina campaigned in 1998 on pro-lottery platforms. Sigelman argued, “Hundreds 
of millions of Alabama dollars have left Alabama to buy lottery tickets in Florida and Georgia. I say it's time for us 
to keep that money here so that our schools can have pre-kindergarten, our schools can have computers, and our 
children can go to college tuition-free.” 
6 Clotfelter and Cook (1989) calculate that the average excise tax on four products in 1985, including federal, state, 
and local taxes was as follows: beer - 15 percent, wine - 17 percent, liquor - 43 percent, and tobacco products - 49 
percent. 
7 National Gambling Impact Study Commission (1999), pp. 2-4.   6
Micro-level evidence is available from two independent surveys: the 1975 National 
Survey of Adult Gambling conducted by Kallick et al. at the University of Michigan and the 1998 
National Survey on Gambling conducted by the National Opinion Research Council (NORC) 
under contract with the National Gambling Impact Study Commission. The Kallick et. al. (1975) 
data consist of 1,749 completed interviews covering participants’ lifetime and past-year 
gambling behavior. The NORC (1998) data contain information about the gambling behavior of 
2,417 adults from a random-digit dial sample.
8 In order to develop estimates of annual lottery 
expenditures from the information obtained by the NORC survey, I adopt a set of assumptions 
used by Clotfelter and Cook (1999).
9 Clotfelter and Cook (1999) calculate that estimates of 
national expenditures based on the NORC (1998) survey and this set of assumptions amount to 
only 86 percent of recorded sales. The reader should keep in mind that actual expenditures 
exceed the amounts discussed in this section. The reported expenditure differences across groups 
reflect true differences under the assumption that groups do not under-report lottery expenditures 
differentially. 
Table 1 presents descriptive information from the NORC survey. The data reveal four 
general facts. First, people in all demographic groups participate in lottery gambling, where 
participation is defined broadly as any gambling during the year. Fifty-five percent of males and 
47 percent of females report participation. The reported participation rate is 52.4 percent among 
whites, 42.3 percent among blacks, and 58.8 percent among Hispanics. Table 1 also shows that 
participation extends across all income groups.  
Second, black respondents spend nearly twice as much on lottery tickets as do white or 
Hispanic respondents. Black women report higher average expenditures than white and Hispanic 
women as well as white and Hispanic men, in all income groups. The average reported 
expenditure among blacks is $200 per year, $476 among those who participate. Black men have 
the highest average expenditures. In particular, the fifteen black male high-school dropouts in the 
sample report average annual expenditures over $1,000; among the ten who participated in 
                                                           
8 Clotfelter and Cook (1999) use the NORC combined survey which includes the RDD sample and a gambling 
patron sample. To preserve the representativeness of the survey sample, I only use the random sample for my 
analyses. 
9 These assumptions first require assigning discrete values to the reported frequencies: 300 to "about every day", 100 
to "1 to 3 times per week," 18 to "once or twice a month," 8 to "a few days all year," and 1 to "only one day in the 
past year". Second, if a respondent reports playing multiple types of games, it is assumed they played lotto no more 
than once per week.    7
lottery gambling during the year, annual expenditures are over $2,000. In the 1999 Current 
Population Survey March file, mean income among this demographic group is $10,400.  
Third, average annual lottery spending in dollar amounts is roughly equal across the 
lowest, middle, and highest income groups. Reported annual expenditures are $125, $113, and 
$145, respectively. This implies that on average, low-income households spend a larger 
percentage of their wealth on lottery tickets than other households. 
Fourth, lottery participation and spending is much higher in states with state lotteries than 
in states without lotteries. As shown in Table 1, participation in lottery gambling among adults 
living in lottery states is 54.7 percent, versus 25.2 in non-lottery states. The difference is 
statistically significant with a t-statistic of 12.0. Average annual lottery expenditures are 
estimated to be $128 among residents of lottery states and $47 among residents of non-lottery 
states. The difference is statistically significant, with a t-statistic of 4.62. By 1998, every 
continental state without a lottery bordered at least one state with one, making out-of-state lottery 
gambling feasible for a sizeable number of adults. The difference is much more pronounced in 
the 1975 survey when only 12 states operated lotteries: 50 percent of adults living in states with 
lotteries participated compared to only 7 percent of adults in non-lottery states.  
 
2.3 Market conditions: theory 
 
2.3.1 The product market and prices 
 
In a perfect market, characterized by full competition and complete information, gambling 
products are supplied competitively by private firms and priced at marginal cost. For simplicity, 
assume that all gambles with the same expected value (EV) are valued equally among 
consumers. There is no differential entertainment value, nor utility over risk. Define the relevant 
price to be the price of a gamble with an EV of $1. Consumers take the private market price as 
given, Pp = MC, and products are allocated efficiently. Contrast this environment to one in which 
there is only one gambling product and it is supplied by a monopolistic state lottery agency at the 
monopoly price Ps. Households face a higher price of gambling, Ps > Pp, so if demand is not fully 
inelastic, they purchase fewer gambles.    8
Historically, states have not established state lottery monopolies in a previously 
competitive environment. The gambling environment in a state pre-state-lottery can be described 
as one in which all lottery games are illegal within the state, but households are offered a limited 
supply of alternative gambling forms: illegal “numbers" betting, legal casinos, horse tracks or 
charitable gambling, or out-of-state lottery products. In this “limited" market, the price of 
gambling faced by household h is  
P0h = min{Pn + α nh, Pc + α ch, Pb + α bh } 
where P0h is the minimum price of gambling among the three available options. Pn is the average 
price of a $1 EV gamble offered by numbers bookkeepers; Pc is the average price of a $1 EV 
gamble offered by casinos or other legal venues; and Pb is the average price of a $1 EV gamble 
offered by lotteries operated in bordering states. The second component α -h is the transaction cost 
to the household of the particular gambling type, which includes any transportation cost as well 
as any stigma associated with the particular form of gambling.  
The establishment of a monopolistic state lottery introduces a new gamble at a price to 
household h of Psh = Ps+α sh. The relevant price of a $1 EV gamble for household h becomes P1h 
= min{Psh, P0h }. If Psh is time-invariant, P1h - P0h <=0, since alternatives remain available. In 
many cases the difference will be less than zero as lottery gambling itself involves minimal 
transportation and arguably stigma. (We might suspect that Psh will change; alternatives could 
become less costly if the introduction of a lottery reduces the stigma of gambling, thereby 
reducing α nh, α ch, and/or α oh.) 
If consumers prefer a corner solution of no gambling or some fixed level of gambling 
losses, there will be no effect on consumer behavior. However, under the usual assumptions 
regarding consumer utility, the price and income effects work in the same direction for gambling, 
and consumers will increase their gambling expenditures. Because the magnitude of the price 
change varies across households, the response will be heterogeneous. (Once we acknowledge 
that gambles have differential entertainment values, the household response to state lotteries 
becomes more varied.) For consumption, the price and income effects work in opposite 
directions; depending on preferences, spending on non-gambling consumption will fall, rise, or 
stay the same. If consumers are rational and informed, and externalities are not relevant, then the 
reallocation of the household budget induced by the introduction of a state lottery will increase 
household welfare.   9
 
2.3.2 Consumer rationality and information  
 
Among the 38 operating state lotteries in 2000, the average pay-out rate was 52 percent, ranging 
from a low of 26 percent in Delaware to a high of 71 percent in Nebraska.
10 When a lotto jackpot 
grows sufficiently large through rollovers accumulating from a series of drawings in which no 
one wins, it may be possible to place a bet with a positive return (Thaler and Ziemba, 1988). But 
such occasions are rare, and most lottery bets placed are on unfavorable gambles. Why would a 
risk-averse consumer purchase such a gamble?  
The first explanation is that consumers know state lotteries offer unfair gambles but 
derive entertainment value from playing them. In this case, consumers are fully rational and 
informed decision makers and the only concern for economists is that the price is set inefficiently 
high at the monopoly price. An alternative explanation is that consumers are misinformed. In 
some instances, the odds of winning the jackpot might not be clear. Moreover, the advertised 
prize is typically the undiscounted prize amount, not the present discounted value of the annuity 
prize.
11 In addition, it might be the case that consumers know that the odds of winning are very 
small, but they do not actually understand the implications. Psychologists have documented an 
“illusion of control,” whereby agents deny the operation of chance, believing that they can 
choose winning numbers through skill or foresight (Langer 1975, 1978). According to 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, agents overweight small probabilities and 
underweight large probabilities. In this line of thought, the agent is rational, but his objective 
function is not the objective function of expected utility theory.
12 If consumers are not making 
informed decisions, the welfare consequences of raising government revenue from lottery 
purchases is ambiguous.    
 
2.3.3 Intra-household externalities 
                                                           
10 LaFleur's 2001 World Lottery Almanac. 
11 For example, when the Powerball jackpot was advertised to be $266 million, the present discounted value of the 
25-year annuity was $147 million (assuming a six percent interest rate.) 
12 An additional concern not addressed in this paper is addiction. It is widely argued that gambling is addictive for 
some people, and lottery gambling is no exception. Becker and Murphy (1988) and Gruber and Koszegi (2000) 
argue that addiction does not necessarily imply irrationality. But, Gruber and Koszegi (2000) also argue that 
addiction amplifies the effects of irrationality. If lottery players are addicted consumers, the welfare consequences of 
state lotteries are ambiguous.   10
 
The above discussion focuses on whether the consumer makes choices that unknowingly harm 
him, either because of irrationality or misinformation. An additional concern is whether the agent 
makes choices that harm those around him, in particular, other members of his household. 
Traditionally, economists have considered the family or household as a single unit that 
maximizes a common objective function subject to the family budget constraint. But recent 
evidence suggests that the household is a collective, not a unitary, entity and that expenditures 
depend in part on who controls the household income (Duflo (2000), Browning and Chiaporri 
(1998), Udry (1996)). If the members of the household do not share a common utility function, 
any increase in gambling expenditures might come at the expense of the well-being of those not 
in control of the household finances.  
 
3 Related evidence 
  
This paper provides to the author’s knowledge the first empirical test of the consequences of 
state lotteries for consumer behavior. Imbens et al. (1999) estimate the effect of lottery winnings 
on players' subsequent earnings, labor supply, consumption, and savings; this is a distinct 
question from the impact of lottery exposure on consumption. Clotfelter and Cook’s 1989 book 
provides a comprehensive description of the legalization, provision, marketing, and implicit 
taxation of state lotteries. Clotfelter et al. (1999) provide a more recent overview of lottery 
operations, with particular attention to who plays the lottery, how the lotteries are marketed, and 
what kinds of policy alternatives exist for state and federal policymakers. It discusses survey 
evidence on lottery gambling based on the 1998 NORC survey discussed in the previous section. 
Worthington (2001) documents demographic predictors of lottery gambling in Australia and 
concludes that the implicit lottery tax is regressive. 
  There has been some limited previous investigation into the sales of lottery products. 
Clotfelter and Cook (1990a) provide a cursory look at the effect of changing prices and payoffs 
on lottery ticket sales. The authors observe 170 consecutive drawings of the Massachusetts lotto 
game in the mid-1980s and find that for each $1,000 increase in the predicted jackpot due to 
“rollover”, sales increase by $333. Garrett and Sobel (1999) analyze the demand for lottery 
games using a 1995 cross-section of 216 lottery games in the United States. The authors make a   11
series of assumptions, including indifference across lottery games, that yield the following result: 
the expected utility for any lottery player in a state can be represented by equating the odds ratio 
of winning the top prize in games G and g  to the utility of winning the top prize in game g. The 
authors use the cubic approximation of Golec and Tamarkin (1998) to estimate a model of 
expected utility; they estimate the odds ratio as a linear function of the top prize, the square of 
the top prize, and the cube of the top prize. The estimated coefficients on the prize and cubic 
prize are significantly
  greater than zero, and the coefficient on the square of the prize is 
significantly
 less than zero. The authors interpret this as evidence of a cubic utility function, 
similar to that proposed by Friedman and Savage (1948) and found by Golec and Tamarkin 
(1998) in the context of betting at horse tracks. 
In addition to the stringency of the identifying assumptions underlying Garrett and Sobel 
(1999), the empirical analysis of the paper has three major limitations. First, all on-line games 
are included in the estimation sample. The result thus relies on the very strong assumption of a 
representative agent across game types. Second, the authors do not control for non-wealth 
creating characteristics of games. If consumers enjoy playing lottery games for reasons other 
than the gamble itself, omitting game features from the estimation is problematic. And finally, 
the key variable in their analysis, jackpot prize, is measured with systematic error. For games 
with variable jackpots, the authors estimate average prize using annual sales data and the percent 
of sales that is allocated to the prize. This approach does not incorporate the weekly variation in 
jackpot size within a game for games with rolling jackpots, but it uses the true jackpot amount 
for fixed jackpot games. 
  Gulley and Scott (1993) and Forrest, Gulley, Simmons (2000) analyze the demand for 
lotteries from the perspective of revenue maximization, rather than consumer preferences. Gulley 
and Scott (1993) examine drawing level sales data from four lotto games in three states from the 
late eighties to early nineties. The authors estimate demand as a function of price, defined as one 
minus the expected value, without controlling for higher-order moments or non-wealth creating 
characteristics. The resulting price elasticities suggest that two games are setting price close to 
the revenue maximizing value, one is setting price too low and the other too high. Forrest, 
Gulley, Simmons (2000) similarly examine sale patterns in the first three years of the UK 
National Lottery to estimate the price elasticity of demand. Their long-run estimate is close to   12
minus one, which they interpret as evidence that the UK government is maximizing lottery 
revenue.  
 
4 The impact of state lotteries on consumer expenditures 
 
Lottery betting is widespread and substantial, as documented in Section 2.2 above. This raises 
the question: does the introduction of a state lottery induce new gambling expenditures and 
thereby crowd-out non-gambling consumption? Or does it merely cause substitution away from 
existing gambling alternatives?  I answer these questions with three separate analyses. First, I 
investigate how total household gambling expenditures respond after to the introduction of a 
state lottery. Second, I analyze how participation in various types of gambling changes. And 
third, I investigate how household non-gambling expenditures shift in response to the 
introduction of a state lottery. I investigate the impact on gambling activities and non-gambling 
consumption separately because there is no single data source containing detailed information 
about both household gambling and non-gambling consumption. 
 
4.1 How do state lotteries affect total household gambling?  
     Evidence from consumer diaries 
 
I investigate whether the introduction of a state lottery leads to increased household gambling 
using confidential Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) - 
Diary Survey data files from 1984 to 1999. All dollar values are adjusted to year 2000 dollars 
using the BLS Consumer Price Index. These files were accessed under an agreement with the 
BLS. The BLS CEX program consists of the quarterly Interview Survey and the two-week Diary 
Survey, each with its own independent sample of approximately 5,000 households (7,500 after 
1998). The Diary Survey collects information about weekly household expenditures on 
frequently purchased small-item goods, including gambling expenditures.
13  
                                                           
13 The data is collected through diary forms that include the following written instructions: “Record all your 
consumer unit's expenses for the 7-day period indicated on the front page….Please use this diary to record purchases 
or expenses, no matter how small or inexpensive they are.”   13
Unfortunately, lottery gambling is drastically underreported in the CEX Diary Survey.
14 
Based on 1998 sales data compiled by LeFleurs Inc., adults living in lottery states averaged $226 
annually on lottery tickets. In contrast, CEX Diary respondents living in lottery states report an 
average of $0.71 for the two-week interval. Assuming smooth annual expenditures, this implies 
mean annual lottery expenditures of only $36. The underreporting is so severe that magnitudes 
implied by an analyses of this data are not reliable. However, the data can reveal whether total 
gambling expenses increase when a state lottery is introduced, even if it can not precisely tell us 
by how much. Furthermore, if underreporting is proportional across demographic groups, the 
CEX Diary data can reveal differential effects across groups. 
Is total gambling higher in lottery states than in non-lottery states? The CEX Diary data 
suggest that both the unconditional probability of engaging in any type of gambling and total 
household gambling expenses are greater among residents in states with state lotteries than 
among residents in non-lottery states.
15 It appears that these differences are not entirely due to 
differences in preferences: mean household gambling expenditures are higher post-lottery 
($2.17) than pre-lottery ($0.87) among states that ever adopt lotteries; the t-statistic of the 
difference is 10.4. This provides preliminary evidence that lottery gambling is not completely 
financed by substitution away from other forms of gambling. 
To corroborate this initial finding, we turn to regression analysis. The analysis exploits 
the variation across states in the timing of state lottery introduction to evaluate whether the 
presence of a state lottery is associated with a change in household gambling. (I use the same 
empirical strategy in the analysis of non-gambling consumption below.) The strategy is to 
compare the change in expenditures among households in states that implement lotteries to the 
change in expenditures among households in states that do not make the lottery transition in the 
same period. Relative to states that have not yet implemented a state lottery, or that did so in the 
past, this analysis identifies the incremental change in expenditures associated with the 
introduction of the lottery. During this time, 21 states switch status from non-lottery to lottery 
                                                           
14 Starting in 1996, the data files record lottery expenditures separately. 
15 The mean two-week gambling participation rate is 8.5 percent in states with a lottery at the time versus 1.9 
percent in non-lottery states; the t-statistic of the difference is 50.3. Unconditional mean two-week gambling 
expenditures are $2.17 in lottery states versus $0.71 in non-lottery states; the t-statistic of the difference is -14.1.   14
state; 16 states and the District of Columbia have lotteries in place the entire period; and the 
remaining 13 states are without a state lottery the entire period.
16 
The estimating equation takes the following form:  
(1) y ijt = α  + λ (LOTSTATE)jt + Xijtβ 1 + Zjyβ 2   + Mijtβ 3 + γ jt + ω y + υ j + ε ijt. 
In the first analysis, yijt is defined as gambling expenditures for household i in state j in the two-
week time period t. In subsequent analyses, yijt is defined as total non-gambling consumption and 
then as spending on particular categories of goods, for household i in state j in reference period t. 
The regressor of interest is the LOTSTATE indictor. It is equal to one if there is a state lottery in 
the household’s state of residency j during the reference period t, and zero otherwise. (For 
quarterly observations, it is based on the presence of a lottery in the first month of the quarter.) 
The coefficient on LOTSTATE is interpreted as the causal effect of the presence of a state lottery 
on the dependent variable. 
The vector Xijt consists of household level controls for family size, household income, 
urban status, number of persons less than 18 and over 64, and the sex, race, marital status, and 
education of the household head. The vector Zjy consists of controls for the state level of 
cigarette, beer, and gasoline taxes, which vary by year. This controls for differences in the prices 
of these goods that are not captured in either year or state effects. The vector Mijt consists of a 
series of dummy variables indicating the months of the year during which the household is 
observed; it is included in the estimation equation to control for seasonal spending effects. 
Finally, γ jt is the monthly state unemployment rate in reference period t (for quarterly 
observations, it is averaged over the quarter); ω y is a binary indictor for the year, which controls 
for any nationwide shocks to spending; and υ j is a dummy that captures fixed effects associated 
with state j. 
   The identifying assumption of equation (1) is that the implementation of the 21 state 
lotteries during this time period does not coincide with other state-level changes that are not 
controlled for in the regression but that might affect household expenditure behavior. An obvious 
candidate is changes in the legalization of other forms of gambling. Fortunately, changes in the 
                                                           
16 The set of switching states consists of CO, CA, IO, OR, MO, WV, MT, KS, SD, VA, FL, WI, ID, IN, KY, MN, 
LA, TX, NE, GA, NM; the always-lottery states are NH, NY, NJ, CT, MA, MI, PA, MD, IL, ME, OH, RI, DE, VT, 
AZ; and the never-lottery states are AL, AK, AR, HI, ID, MS, NC, NV, OK, SC, TN, UT, WY.   15
availability of other forms of gambling does not coincide with the timing of state lottery 
introduction.
17  
Table 2 displays the results from estimating equation (1) for gambling behavior using 
CEX Diary data.
18 Mean gambling expenditures and participation among households in states 
that do not have a lottery in place at the time are listed in columns 1 and 3, respectively. Column 
2 reports coefficients from an OLS regression of equation (1) with expenditure level as the 
dependent variable. As expenditures constitute a limited dependent variable, interpreting the 
regression coefficient is not entirely straightforward. When Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression is used to estimate the equation for expenditure levels, observations with zero 
spending are included in the analysis and the estimated impacts combine the extensive and 
intensive margins.  These effects are reported separately in columns 4, 5, and 6. Column 4 lists 
the coefficients from OLS estimation of equation (1) with the dependent variable defined to be 
“any gambling expenditures”; column 5 lists marginal effects from a Probit specification. The 
final column reports the coefficient on LOTSTATE when the dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of expenditures. The coefficient necessarily captures changes on the intensive margin 
as the sample is conditioned on positive spending. To the extent that the introduction of a state 
lottery affects the extensive margin of gambling, the set of households with positive gambling 
expenditures is changed and the estimated effect on intensity is contaminated.
19 
The results in Table 2 confirm that the introduction of a state lottery leads households to 
increase total gambling expenditures and participation. For the overall sample, the estimated 
coefficient on LOTSTATE in the OLS levels specification reveals that two-week gambling 
expenditures increase by a reported $1.43, off a mean of $0.71. The results of OLS and Probit 
                                                           
17 The legalization of casino gambling substantially lags the spread of state lotteries. Before the early 1990s, legal 
casinos only operated in Nevada and Atlantic City, New Jersey. Now they are legal in 28 states. Similarly, riverboat 
casinos did not begin operating legally until the first one opened in Iowa in 1991. Most Native American tribal 
gambling started after 1987, when the United States Supreme Court issued a decision confirming the inability of 
states to regulate commercial gambling on Indian reservations. 
18 With the exception that state unemployment rate is not controlled for in the analyses. State unemployment data 
were not available when the confidential BLS CEX Diary were accessed at BLS.  
18 Tobit and sample-selection models provide alternatives but have serious drawbacks. Perhaps the most pertinent in 
this context is conceptual: these models interpret the dependent variable as the censored observation of an 
underlying continuously distributed latent variable. The latent index coefficients have no predictive value for 
observed spending amounts. The two-part model (2PM) introduced by Cragg (1971) explicitly combines the 
participation and intensity effects. As discussed in Angrist (2001), researchers using this model simply pick a 
functional form for each part, e.g. linear probability or probit for the first part and a linear or log-linear model for the 
second part. This has the advantage over the Tobit and other sample-selection models is that it does not impose   16
estimation of equation (1) for participation in any gambling suggest that the introduction of a 
state lottery leads to an increase in the two-week gambling participation rate. Finally, column 6 
reports the estimated effect of the introduction of a state lottery on the intensity of spending. The 
negative coefficient on the lottery state indicator suggests that new, less-committed gamblers are 
being brought into the gambling sample. Estimation of a Tobit specification, which includes non-
gamblers in the estimation sample, corroborates the finding that gambling expenditures increase 
significantly in response to the presence of a state lottery. 
Table 2 also displays results separately by income group, where households are divided 
into three strata (thirds of the income distribution) in the CEX survey data. Households in all 
income groups respond to a state lottery with increased gambling participation and expenditures. 
(Due to sample size limitations, estimating the equation separately by race is uninformative.)  
 
4.2 How do state lotteries affect participation in various forms of gambling? 
     Evidence from national gambling surveys 
 
The finding that household gambling expenditures rise when a state lottery is introduced 
suggests that lottery spending is not totally financed by a reduction in expenditures on previously 
existing gambling alternatives. But are they partly financed by substitution away from other 
gambling? To answer this question, I analyze the NORC (1998) and Kallick et. al (1975) data. 
Relative to the CEX Diary data, these data sources offer the advantage of recording participation 
by type of gambling, but they have the disadvantage of not containing expenditure amounts. The 
analysis of this data is thus limited to observing effects on the extensive margin of various types 
of gambling.  
I conduct a regression-adjusted difference-in-difference (DD) analysis on the combined 
data to determine how the introduction of a state lottery impacts participation in various forms of 
gambling. The DD analysis compares the mean change in gambling participation between 1974 
and 1997 among states that implement a lottery in the intervening years to the mean change in 
gambling participation among states that did not. The comparison group consists of the set of 
states that either never have a lottery or have a lottery as early as 1974. The effect of interest is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
restrictions on the latent index structure. Functional forms can also be chosen that impose nonnegativity. However, 
the 2PM does not attempt to solve the sample selection problem and the second part can not be interpreted as causal.   17
captured in the coefficient on LOTST7597*year1997 — the interaction between an indicator 
variable for the year 1997 and an indicator variable for residing in a state that adopted a lottery 
between 1975 and 1997.
20 All regressions control for the following individual demographics: 
sex, race, marital status, education, and regular attendance at religious services. They also control 
for main year effects and a full set of state effects. 
Results from the DD analysis of the effect of introducing a lottery on gambling 
participation are displayed in Table 3. The introduction of a state lottery leads to a statistically 
significant 50.4 percentage point increase in the probability that an adult participates in gambling 
of any kind during the year. Not surprisingly, the introduction of a state lottery leads to an 
increased probability of lottery gambling. More interestingly, the introduction of a state lottery 
does not have a negative effect on participation in track, bingo, private, or unlicensed gambling. 
The estimated coefficients on the independent variable of interest –  LOTST7597*year1997 – are 
remarkably close to zero in each of the four regressions. Again, the data reveal that adults in all 
income groups respond to the introduction of a state lottery with increased gambling 
participation. For no income group do we see a substitution away from other types of gambling. 
 
4.3 How do state lotteries affect household consumption?  
     Evidence from consumer interviews  
 
The analyses discussed above find no evidence that household lottery spending is financed by 
substitution away from previously existing forms of gambling. State lottery expenditures must 
therefore displace non-gambling expenditures. In this section, I analyze BLS Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CEX) - Interview Survey data from 1982 to 1998 to determine to what 
extent household non-gambling consumption is decreased when a state lottery is introduced. The 
CEX Interview Survey collects information on major items of expense and household 
                                                           
20 While a DD strategy "differences out" ex ante differences, it is still interesting to know whether such differences 
exist. Are there differences ex ante in gambling participation rates, conditional on individual demographics, between 
states in 1974 that eventually adopt a lottery and those that do not? Regression results suggest there are not. 
Lotst7597 is a binary indicator for whether the state implements a lottery between the two survey years. The 
coefficients on lotst7597 (standard errors in parenthesis) in regressions with binary dependent variables indicating 
participation in the various forms of gambling are as follows: lottery .055 (.028), track .044 (.039), bingo .045 
(.035), private .105 (.081), and unlicensed .073 (.071). These results suggest that there is no ex ante statistically 
significant difference in gambling participation between residents of never-lottery states and residents of states that 
eventually adopt lotteries.    18
characteristics.
21 Households are asked about expenditures for up to three consecutive quarters. 
The BLS estimates that 90 to 95 percent of expenditures are covered by the Interview survey, but 
gambling expenditures are excluded. The analysis therefore asks a reduced-form question: does 
the introduction of a state lottery lead to declines in non-gambling consumption.
22  
I estimate equation (1) for non-gambling consumption. Table 4 lists the results. Column 1 
lists mean spending among households in states that do not have a lottery in place at the time. 
Column 2 reports coefficients from an OLS regression of equation (1) with spending level as the 
dependent variable. (All households have positive spending so composition-bias is not an issue.) 
Column 3 lists the implied percentage change from the non-lottery mean. The final column 
reports the coefficient on LOTSTATE when the dependent variable of equation (1) is the natural 
logarithm of expenditures. Specifying the function as log-linear has two relevant properties: one, 
the effect of outliers on the estimated coefficient is mitigated, and two, the coefficients are 
interpreted as percentage changes. This allows us to observe the proportional decline in different 
categories of spending.  
For the overall sample, total quarterly spending falls by $115, implying an average 
decrease of $38 in monthly household consumption expenditures. The average number of adults 
in a CEX household is 1.57; from this we calculate an average monthly consumption reduction 
of $23 per-adult. Based on the LeFleurs sales data, monthly sales per-adult average $18 across 
the 38 state lotteries. We thus conclude that household lottery gambling is completely financed 
by a reduction in non-gambling consumption.  
The decrease of $115 in consumption expenditures represents a decline of 1.6 percent 
relative to mean total spending in the absence of a state lottery. The log-linear specification finds 
a decline of 1.9 percent (with an associated standard error of 0.7). This latter estimate might be 
preferred since the effect of outliers is mitigated. The implication is that on average, households 
displace two percent of their quarterly consumption expenditures with state lottery ticket 
purchases.  
                                                           
21 The public use CEX Interview files do not include records from Rhode Island and Montana. Furthermore, the 
BLS public files suppress the state of residence for some records in order to meet the Census Disclosure Review 
Board’s criterion that the smallest geographically identifiable area have a population of at least 100,000. The 
consequence is that approximately 17 percent of records do not have state identified: state is left blank for all records 
from Mississippi, New Mexico, Maine, and South Dakota, and for some records from other states.  The consumption 
analysis sample therefore includes observations from 42 states and the District of Columbia. 
22 The unreliability of gambling magnitudes found in the analysis of CEX Diary data preclude the construction of a 
two-sample IV estimate of the effect of increased gambling on non-gambling consumption.    19
The bottom panel of Table 4 presents the results from two specification checks on the 
model. Recall from the discussion in Section 2.3 that the introduction of a state lottery has a non-
positive effect on the price of gambling. The magnitude of the price decrease varies by 
household, depending on the availability of alternative gambling forms and the associated 
transportation or stigma costs. The theoretical implication is that if a neighboring state already 
offers a state lottery, the introduction of one will have less of an effect on the price. The further 
implication is that the household response in terms of gambling and non-gambling consumption 
expenditures will be smaller.  
  The bottom of Table 4 reports the regression-adjusted effect of the introduction of a state 
lottery when a bordering state already operates one. The coefficient on the LOTSTATE indicator 
captures the “pure” effect of introducing a state lottery on total non-gambling consumption. The 
coefficient on LOTSTATE*BORDER captures the additional effect of introducing a lottery when 
a neighboring state already operates one. (This interaction term equals zero if the state lottery is 
introduced before any neighboring states introduce one; it does not switch to one if and when a 
neighboring state finally does introduce a state lottery.) For the overall sample, the analysis finds 
that households reduce quarterly consumption by $290 when a state lottery is introduced, as 
shown in column 1. If the lottery is introduced when a neighboring state already operates a 
lottery, the effect is mitigated by $209, as shown in column 2, though the point estimate is not 
statistically significant. Columns 3 and 4 report the coefficients from a log-linear specification. 
These estimates suggest that the “pure” effect of introducing a state lottery is a decline in 
quarterly household spending of 3.6 percent; if a border state previously operated a lottery, the 
decline is 1.6 percent. 
  An additional question is whether the shift in expenditures is temporary. The bottom 
panel of Table 4 confirms that the reduction in consumption is sustained in the long run. In the 
first two years after a state lottery is introduced, households respond with an average decline in 
quarterly non-gambling consumption of 1.7 percent (standard error of 0.8). This response is 
sustained: the average decline in consumption among households in states with lotteries that 
have been operating for at least two years, relative to households residing in states without 
lotteries, is 1.4 percent (standard error of 0.7).  
 
4.4 How do state lotteries effect the consumption of low-income households?   20
     Evidence from consumer interviews  
 
Among households in the lowest income third, total quarterly spending is reduced by $139 (see 
Table 4), implying a decrease of $46 in monthly household consumption expenditures. 
(Households are divided into three strata based on the income distribution in the CEX Interview 
Survey sample.) Based on the average number of adults in a CEX household, we calculate a 
monthly consumption reduction of $29 per-adult. How does this reduction compare to lottery 
ticket purchases? Sales data are not available by income group, but we can compare this decline 
in consumption to reported lottery gambling in the NORC (1998) survey data. Lottery-state 
adults in the lowest income third report an average of $139.5 in lottery spending; adjusting this 
figure for known underreporting (see Section 4 above) yields average yearly spending of $162.2, 
or $14 per month. These numbers suggest that low-income households are financing their lottery 
gambling completely by a decline in consumption. The data suggest that lottery gambling might 
crowd in other gambling expenses, perhaps by reducing the “stigma” associated with gambling.  
Households in the lowest income third experience the most pronounced percentage 
decline in consumption spending: 2.7 percent (standard error of 1.2). As reported in Table 4, 
OLS estimation of the log-linear specification suggests that the average response among 
households in the middle income group is a decline of 0.5 percent (standard error of 0.8); 1.4 
percent (standard error of 0.8) among those in the highest income group. The data reject the 
hypothesis that the proportional decline for the middle income group is the same as for the 
lowest income group, but can not reject the hypothesis for the highest income group.  
Table 5 offers a more detailed picture of how low-income households change their 
consumption in the presence of a state lottery.
23 Equation (1) is estimated separately for 11 
categories of goods: food at home; medical drugs and personal care; home - rent, mortgage, 
other bills; alcohol; smoking products; food out of the home; entertainment; education; 
household repairs, services, and furnishings; clothes (children and adult); and transportation 
and cars. The table reports estimates for the levels, participation, and log-linear specifications. It 
is difficult to obtain precise estimates in this exercise, but the analysis does offer a few 
interesting insights. First, the decline in consumption appears to be spread across expenditure 
categories. Point estimates yielded by the logarithm specification are negative for 8 of the 11 
                                                           
23 Detailed results for the middle and highest income thirds are available from author.   21
categories.
 Statistically significant reductions are observed in spending categories that might be 
classified as “necessities:” food at home and home expenditures including rent, mortgage, and 
other bills. In terms of within-household externalities, it is interesting to note that lottery 
spending appears to be a substitute for the “adult good” alcohol; on the other hand, there is no 
evidence that spending is reduced on children’s clothing, but statistical power is potentially a 
problem.  
 
5 Consumer demand for lottery products  
 
The above section provides unambiguous evidence that households respond to the introduction 
of a state lottery by increasing their gambling expenditures at the expense of a reduction in other 
forms of consumption. If consumers are fully-rational and fully-informed, and externalities are 
not relevant, then these behavioral responses are consumer-welfare enhancing. However, if the 
oft-raised concern that consumers are making misinformed choices is true, then the effect on 
consumer welfare is not clear. This section provides an initial exploration of consumer choices 
over lottery products and investigates whether consumers of lottery products appear to make 
informed choices.  
As outlined in the introduction, the hypothesis that lottery consumers are being deceived 
implies that consumer demand for lottery tickets does not respond to the expected value of a 
gamble, conditional on other features of the game. If consumers are misinformed, their demand 
for lottery gambles might respond to the top prize, but would not systematically respond to the 
expected value of the bet. The analysis of this section directly tests this proposition. In addition, 
if consumers are risk-averse, then participation in gambles with an average return of 52 cents on 
the dollar reflects a fully-rational, fully-informed decision only if the participation provides some 
consumption, or entertainment, value. This suggests that an additional test of consumer 
rationality and information is whether consumers derive entertainment value from lottery 
gambling. To test this I investigate whether consumer demand responds to variation in non-
wealth creating characteristics of lottery games, such as the number of drawings per week or the 
number of digits chosen. I perform these two tests simultaneously.  
 
5.1 Data and empirical strategy   22
 
To investigate the nature of consumer demand, I combine game level sales data with detailed 
information about the corresponding lottery game. The analysis is conducted at the level of state, 
game, and week. To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to compile a comprehensive data 
set of lottery game characteristics, and this is therefore the first analysis of its kind. I limit the 
empirical analysis to lotto games, to the exclusion of other types of lottery products including 
numbers games, instant scratch-off, keno, bingo, and VLT products.
24 Relative to other products, 
lotto games vary substantially in prize amounts and structure. There is both variation across 
games and over time within a game as jackpot amounts frequently “rollover” and accumulate. 
Additionally, to draw conclusions about individual behavior from aggregate sales data I must 
rely on a representative agent assumption; limiting the analysis to a single type of lottery product 
makes this assumption substantially less stringent. 
The structure of a lotto game is defined by the number of digits the bettor chooses and the 
size of the field. For example, in a lotto game with a 6/44 game matrix, a bettor chooses 6 
numbers without replacement from a field of 44; the odds of picking the winning numbers are 1 
in 7,059,052. Some lotto games have fixed jackpot amounts; others have “rolling” jackpots such 
that if the jackpot is not won on a given draw, the jackpot (minus the prize payments for partially 
correct bets) is rolled over into the jackpot for the next drawing. Some lotto games pay the 
jackpot as a cash prize, others as a long-term annuity, and others offer a choice. Lotto games also 
differ in the number of draws per week.
 25 
                                                           
24 I include multi-state lotto games in the sample because the two types of products have the same essential 
structures; they differ only in scale. Multi-state lotto games pool sales across states to engender larger jackpots. 
There are six unique multi-state lotto products: Wildcard, Powerball, Cash 4 Life, and Daily Millions, which are run 
by the Multi-State Lottery Association; and The Big Game and Megabucks, which are not. I consider the state 
version of a multi-state product a unique game; for example, Powerball in Minnesota is considered a different game 
than Powerball in Montana. This seems appropriate as states run individual advertising campaigns.  
25 I offer two examples. First, a resident of Maryland playing the "Cash in Hand" game can purchase a ticket from 
any Maryland State Lottery location any day of the week. There are three drawings per week. He pays the retail 
agent $1 and picks 7 out of 31 numbers, or marks "quick pick" and lets the machine pick the numbers for him. If the 
7 numbers on his gameboard match the 7 winning numbers (with odds of 1:2,629,575), and he claims his prize 
within 182 days from the date of drawing, he is paid $500,000 cash. The state of Maryland will pay each game 
board with the winning numbers $500,000. (In the unlikely event that more than 5 game boards win, all winning 
boards will receive an equal share of a $2,500,000 pool.) Second, a resident of Florida playing Florida Lotto pays $1 
and picks 6 numbers out of 53, or marks "quick pick". She can place bets on up to 26 consecutive drawings in 
advance. If the 6 numbers on her ticket match the 6 winning numbers (with odds of 1:22,957,480), and she claims 
her prize within 180 days, she wins the jackpot amount. The actual prize depends on sales and the number of 
winners for the draw. If there is no ticket with the winning number, the jackpot rolls over and the cash available for 
that jackpot is added to the next jackpot prize pool.   23
I obtained weekly sales data from 1992 to 1999 from Lefleurs Inc., a group that collects 
weekly sales data from state lottery agencies. (Appendix Table 2 describes the sales data.) I 
obtained information about game characteristics from state lottery websites and from lottery 
game brochures provided by state lottery agencies. For games with rolling jackpots, I obtained 
times series data on the advertised jackpot amounts from various state lottery agencies. The 
sample excludes games for which only realized jackpot data is available; in games in which the 
jackpot rolls over, the actual jackpot amount is a function of both the rollover amount and the 
induced additional sales. Using the advertised amount avoids incorporating this latter portion 
into the independent variable. For state-game-week cells that have more than one advertised 
jackpot (because there are multiple drawings per week and the jackpot is not a fixed amount), I 
take the maximum advertised jackpot during the week. The final sample used in the empirical 
analysis consists of nearly 15,000 observations at the game-week level. These observations are 
from a sample of 91 lotto products from 33 states.  
The empirical analysis estimates how weekly sales of lotto tickets respond to changes in 
the statistical moments of the gamble as well as to differences in game characteristics. The 
estimating equation takes the following form:  
ysgw = α  + λ 1(expected value)sgw + λ 2(variance)sgw + λ 3(skewness)sgw + 
+ λ 5(nominal top prize)sgw + Xsgwβ 1 +  Zsyβ 2 +   ζ s + ω w + υ g + ε ijt. 
where ysgw is the natural logarithm of per adult sales from game g, in state s, in week w. (A log-
linear specification is used in order to generate estimates of percentage changes in sales, rather 
than changes in levels. In addition, the logarithmic transformation removes the heteroskedasticity 
in the residuals of sales.) The vector Xsgw includes non-wealth creating characteristics of the 
game. The vector Zsy includes controls for the proportion of the state population in seven age-sex 
demographic groups, observed at the year level. All regressions control for state and week 
effects, ζ s + ω w.  In some specifications, the equation is estimated with a game dummy υ g to 
control for unobserved product fixed effects. The equation is estimated using OLS, weighted by 
state population. Standard errors are robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the state-
year level to flexibly control for correlation of the error terms. 
The moments of a one dollar gamble depend on several factors: the structure of the game, 
the value of previous rolled-over jackpots, and the number of tickets bought in the current 
drawing. The moments are calculated using the “real top prize,” which is the present discounted   24
value of the advertised jackpot (assuming a six percent interest rate), and all lower prize tiers 
offered by a game. All prize amounts are adjusted to year 2000 dollars. I make the simplifying 
assumption that the probability of multiple winners, which depends on the number of tickets 
bought and the numbers chosen by bettors, is negligible. Hence, the expected value is not 
adjusted for the probability of having to share the jackpot. The mean expected value of a $1 bet 
among the sample of all lotto games is 0.53. 
The “nominal top prize” of a game is the advertised dollar amount. This is the 
undiscounted sum of the game-specific number of annual payments. In the analysis, the 
“nominal top prize” is adjusted to year 2000 dollars using the Consumer Price Index, but it is not 
discounted to present terms. In most instances, it is nearly twice as large as the “real top prize.” 
The highest single-state lotto prize in the sample is associated with the Texas Lotto in January, 
1994: a nominal top prize of $18 million, with a present discounted value of $10 million. The 
largest prize among multi-state games is associated with the Powerball game in July 1998; the 
nominal prize amount is $266 million, with a present discounted value of $147 million. (The 
actual jackpot won on this game was $295.7 million, in year 2000 dollars.) The vector Xsgw 
includes the following non-wealth creating game characteristics: number of draws per week, age 
of game, age of game squared, how many numbers the bettor picks, and the jackpot type (cash, 




Table 6 displays the estimation results. All regressions control for state unemployment rate, state 
fixed effects, week fixed effects, and state demographic composition. Column 1 displays the 
results of estimating demand as a function of only the statistical moments of the gamble. The 
results provide preliminary evidence that consumers respond positively to the expected value of 
a gamble, but the point estimate is not statistically significant. This specification suggests that 
consumers like variance, but dislike skewness. Note that this finding contradicts the finding of 
Garrett and Sobel (1999) that consumers respond negatively to variance and positively to 
skewness.
26 Column 2 adds entertainment characteristics as independent variables. The positive 
                                                           
26 A rigorous analysis of consumer preferences for risk requires more structure than the analysis presented here; such 
an analysis using this data is provided in Kearney 2002.   25
coefficient on expected value increases in absolute value to 0.683 and is statistically significant 
(standard error of 0.113). This finding rejects the hypothesis that lottery players are misinformed 
evaluators of gambles.  
Column 2 shows that consumer purchases are also driven by non-wealth creating 
characteristics of lottery products. This implies that consumers are deriving entertainment value 
from playing the lottery. For example, consumers appear to prefer picking more numbers to 
fewer and demand more of a game as it ages. The specification reported in column 3 adds the 
nominal top prize as an independent variable. Not surprisingly, it enters positively and is 
statistically significant. The interesting result in this column is that the estimated positive effect 
of expected value is maintained and even strengthened. The point estimate is 0.757, with a 
standard error of 0.108. Replacing “expected value” with the natural logarithm of one minus the 
expected value in this specification, yields an estimated price elasticity of -0.39.  
The specifications reported in columns 4 and 5 incorporate product fixed effects into the 
model. The estimation now controls for differences in sales across games that are driven by fixed 
game characteristics not explicitly captured by the regressors in the model. Again, the data 
demonstrate that sales are positively driven by the expected value of a gamble and that demand 
responds to the non-wealth creating characteristics of lotto games. The specification in column 5 
yields an estimated price elasticity of -0.17.  
It is consistent with these findings to claim that consumers are fully rational: they derive 
an entertainment value from participating in the lotto gamble that equals the price of the gamble 
(one minus expected value), and then, insofar as they are making investments, they recognize 
which gambles are better investments. On the other hand, it is also consistent to argue that 
consumers are at least partially irrational, believing that the non-wealth characteristics bear on 
the likelihood of winning positive returns. Though the analysis does not allow us to discriminate 
between the two scenarios, it does imply that consumers are at least partly – and potentially fully 




This paper has offered two main contributions to the public debate regarding the consumer 
consequences of state lotteries. The first contribution is an empirical investigation of how   26
households shift their spending in response to the introduction of a state lottery. I have used the 
variation across states in the timing of state lottery introduction to compare the change in 
expenditures among households in states that implement lotteries to the change in expenditures 
among households in states that do not. The analyses are based on consumer expenditure data 
from 1982 to 1998, during which time 21 states implemented lotteries. 
The evidence on household gambling expenditures demonstrates that households increase 
their gambling expenditures in the presence of a state lottery. Total gambling after a lottery is 
introduced exceeds previous gambling expenditures, which implies that households are not 
financing lottery gambling completely by substituting away from other forms of gambling. A 
complementary analysis of participation in various forms of gambling finds that there is no 
substitution away from participation in other forms of gambling when a lottery is introduced. In 
fact, my analysis of household non-gambling consumption suggests that household spending on 
lottery tickets is financed completely by a reduction in other forms of household consumption. 
The introduction of a state lottery is associated with a decline in household non-gambling 
consumption of $115 per quarter. This figure implies a monthly reduction of $23 in per-adult 
consumption, which compares to average monthly sales of $18 per lottery-state adult. The 
response is most pronounced for low-income households, which on average reduce non-
gambling expenditures by approximately three percent. The impact of a state lottery is found to 
be more pronounced if no bordering state previously implemented a lottery. In addition, the 
decline in non-gambling consumption is sustained in the long run.   
The second major contribution of the paper is an evaluation of whether lottery consumers 
appear to be making informed choices. To evaluate this question I analyze lottery sales data from 
91 lotto games from 1992 to 1998 as a function of lottery product attributes, including the 
statistical moments of the gamble, the advertised undiscounted top prize, and the non-wealth 
creating characteristics of the game. The analysis suggests that sales are positively driven by the 
expected value of a gamble, controlling for other characteristics. This finding is robust to 
alternative specifications, including controlling for unobserved product fixed effects. The NORC 
(1998) survey offers supporting evidence that agents understand that state lotteries do not offer 
fair bets. The survey asks respondents how much of the ticket price of their favorite game do 
they think is returned as prize money. Only 7.5 percent of the respondents thought the pay-out   27
was above the actual average pay-out rate. This finding suggests that consumers are at least 
partly – and potentially fully – informed in recognizing the wealth value of a bet.  
Two things should be kept in mind when interpreting the results of this paper. First, the 
analysis has identified average effects, but due to data limitations, can not sufficiently examine 
the heterogeneity of household response. While the average household reduces consumption by 
$38 a month in response to the introduction of a state lottery, there are likely to be some 
households in the tail of the distribution who forego much greater amounts of consumption. 
Second, intra-household externalities are a potential issue that can not be sufficiently addressed 
with available data. For example, there is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that some 
members of lottery-gambling households would rather not spend household money on lottery 
tickets. Future work examining these issues would lead to a more thorough understanding of the 
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Table 1 
 Lottery Participation Rates and Expenditures 
1998 NORC Survey Data 
   Overall    Lottery States    Non-lottery states 































                       
overall  2,417  51.3  107.3 
(470.7) 
 2,047  55.7  128.4    357  25.2  47.3 
(240.9) 
male  1,152  55.8  143.2 
(525.7) 
 981  51.8  153.4    163  30.1  82.5 
(331.1) 
female  1,265  47.2  91.8 
(494.6) 
 1,066  59.9  105.3    194  21.1  17.8 
(114.7) 
                       
white  1,769  52.4  107.9 
(510.0) 
 1,059  57.0  119.3 
(544.3) 
 251  24.3  41.4 
(215.8) 
black  291  42.3  200.1 
(711.9) 
 237  46.0  230.0 
(770.5) 
 53  24.5  67.0 
(333.8) 
hispanic  170  58.8  108.4 
(214.9) 
 154  61.0  107.5 
(208.0) 
 14  28.6  86.7 
(288.0) 
other  180  47.2  74.9 
(257.3) 
 141  51.8  81.8 
(263.1) 
 38  28.9  45.5 
(238.1) 
                      
Household income                       
< 27,000  353  45.0  125.4 
(560.5) 
 287  50.5  139.5 
(610.0) 




27,000 to 54,000  445  56.2  113.4 
(455.0) 
 368  63.0  127.1 
(485.2) 




>54,000  635  59.5  145.8 
(554.3) 
 550  62.9  158.9 
(584.1) 




                       
hs drop out  326  46.3  170.2 
(716.4) 
 257  54.0  197.2 
(794.0) 
 65  13.8  63.9 
(261.4) 
hs graduate  613  52.4  137.5 
(573.8) 
 527  57.3  155.1 
(613.2) 
 82  19.5  28.8 
(175.2) 
some college  736  55.6  109.1 
(504.0) 
 624  58.8  120.0 
(538.2) 
 110  36.4  47.3 
(231.3) 
 college grad  742  48.4  82.2 
(310.6) 
 639  52.0  86.7 
(315.3) 
 100  .25  51.8 
(283.0) 
notes: 
1. Data is from the 1998 National Survey on Gambling conducted by the National Opinion Research Council (NORC) 
under contract with the National Gambling Impact Study Commission. These estimates of annual lottery expenditures 
incorporate a set of assumptions used by Clotfelter and Cook (1999), as described in the text. The data is not adjusted 
for the underreporting of lottery sales documented by Clotfelter and Cook (1999).  
2. All expenditure amounts are adjusted to year 2000 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. 
3. Standard errors in parenthesis. 




Effects of a State Lottery on Two-week Gambling Participation Rate and Expenditures: 
Coefficient on LOTSTATE 
 
CEX Diary Data 
   (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  (5)    (6)  

















                  










***  .061 
(.004) 
***  -.282 
(.089) 
*** 
                     










***  .035 
(.003) 
***  -.395 
(.186) 
** 











***  .070 
(.003) 
***  -.207 
(.156) 
 
                     










***  .109 
(.004) 
***  -.308 
(.131) 
** 
                  
notes: 
1. Data are from confidential Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) - Diary Survey 
data files from 1984 to 1999. Data are not adjusted for the underreporting of lottery expenditures described in the text. 
All dollar values are adjusted to year 2000 dollars using the BLS Consumer Price Index. 
2. The LOTSTATE indicator is equal to one if there is a state lottery in the household’s state of residency during the 
two-week reference period.  
3. Standard errors are White’s robust standard errors adjusted for clustering within a state-year cell.  
4. *** indicates significance at 99 percentile ** at 95 percentile 
5. A Tobit specification for levels suggests the same patterns. The coefficients are as follows: overall 58.2; lowest 
income 31.7; middle income  46.0; highest income  72.9. 
6. All regressions include controls for the following household demographics: family size, before-tax income, urban 
status, number of persons less than 18 and over 64, the sex and educational attainment of the household head, the race 
of the household head (when it is not the conditioning variable). All regressions also include controls for state, year, 
month of year, and state cigarette, beer, and gasoline tax levels. 




Effects of a State Lottery on Gambling Participation: 
Difference-in-Difference Estimates 
 
Dep Variable   any       lottery    track   bingo   private  unlicensed 
































































                          
notes:  
1. Data on participation in the five types of gambling are from the 1975 National Survey of Adult Gambling conducted 
by Kallick et al. at the University of Michigan and the 1998 National Survey on Gambling conducted by the National 
Opinion Research Council (NORC) under contract with the National Gambling Impact Study Commission. The Kallick 
et. al. (1975) data consist of 1,749 completed interviews covering participants’ lifetime and past-year gambling behavior. 
The NORC (1998) data contain information about the gambling behavior of 2,417 adults from a random-digit dial 
sample. 
2. The reported difference-in-difference estimate is the coefficient on LOTST7597*year1997 — the interaction between 
an indicator variable for the year 1997 and an indicator variable for residing in a state that adopted a lottery between 
1975 and 1997.  
3. All regressions control for sex, race, marital status, education, and regular attendance at religious services. They also 
control for main year and state effects. 
4. Standard errors are White’s robust standard errors adjusted for clustering within a state-year cell.  
5. *** indicates significance at 99 percentile ** at 95 percentile 
6. “Any” gambling is not equal to the sum of the five types of gambling displayed because the 1998 file separately 
categorizes participation in casino, charitable, card, bar/restaurant, internet, and indian reservation gambling.  
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Table 4 
  Effects of a State Lottery on Quarterly Consumption: 
Coefficient on LOTSTATE 
CEX Interview Data 
  (1)    (2)     (3)   (4)  














7362.5   -115.0 
(58.4) 
**   -0.016    -.019 
(.007) 
*** 
                
income 1 
(n=81,751) 
4,650.6  -126.0 
(81.2) 





6,135.2  -14.6 
(64.2) 





11,104.8  -138.5 
(109.9) 
   -0.012    -.014 
(.008) 
 
      
Does bordering a lottery state matter?    
  OLS Level    OLS Ln 
  Lotstate   Lotstate*border    Lotstate    Lotstate*border 












                 
Are there short-term and long-term effects?          
  OLS Level    OLS Ln 
 Years  1 
 or 2 
  Year 3 & 
beyond 
    Years 1  
or 2 
  Year 3 & 
beyond 
 













1. Data are from BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) - Interview Survey data files from 1982 to 1998. 
2. The LOTSTATE indicator is equal to one if there is a state lottery in the household’s state of residence at the beginning 
of the reference period quarter.  
3. Quarterly consumption is defined as household expenditures on the following 41 categories of goods: Food at home, 
food away from home, alcoholic beverages, housing mortgage and tax payments, housing maintenance, rented dwellings, 
other lodging, utilities/fuels/public services, child care, adult care, other household operations, household textiles, 
furniture, floor coverings, major appliances, small appliances and misc. housewares, misc. household equipment, men’s 
clothing, boys’ clothing, women’s clothing, girls’ clothing, baby clothing, footwear, other apparel, new cars and trucks, 
used cars and trucks, other vehicles, vehicle financing, gasoline and motor oil, vehicle repair, vehicle insurance, public 
transportation, vehicle rental, prescription drugs, entertainment fees, television expenses, other entertainment, personal 
care, reading material, educational expenses, tobacco and smoking supplies. 
4. Standard errors are White’s robust standard errors adjusted for clustering within a state-year cell.  
5. *** indicates significance at 99 percentile ** at 95 percentile 
6. The lowest income third in the sample has annual household income <=$9337.4; the highest has income >=$26,151. 
7. All regressions include controls for the following household demographics: family size, before-tax income, urban 
status, number of persons less than 18 and over 64, the sex, race, and educational attainment of the household head. All 
regressions also include controls for state, year, month of year, and state cigarette, beer, and gasoline tax levels and 
monthly state unemployment rate. 
   35
 
Table 5 
Effects of a State Lottery on Quarterly Consumption: 
Coefficient on LOTSTATE, by Expenditure Category 
CEX Interview Data – Households in the Lowest Income Third 











total spending  4,650.6   -126.0 
(81.2) 
 -    -.027 
(.012) 
**  
                  







2. medical drugs and 
personal care 







3. home – mortgage, rent, 
other bills  










































9. house - repairs, 
services, furnishings 





































                  
sample size     81,751             
notes: 
1. Data are from BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) - Interview Survey data files from 1982 to 1998. 
2. The LOTSTATE indicator is equal to one if there is a state lottery in the household’s state of residence at the beginning of the 
reference period quarter. 
3. Category 3 includes expenditures on mortgage and tax payments, rented dwellings, other lodging, and utilities/fuels/public services. 
Category 7 includes expenditures on entertainment fees, television expenses, other entertainment, and reading. Category 9 includes 
expenditures on housing maintenance, child care, adult care, other household operations, household textiles, furniture, floor coverings, 
major appliances, small appliances and misc. housewares, and misc. household equipment. Category 11 includes expenditures on new 
cars and trucks, used cars and trucks, other vehicles, vehicle financing, gasoline and motor oil, vehicle repair, vehicle insurance, public 
transportation, and vehicle rentals. 
4. Standard errors are White’s robust standard errors adjusted for clustering within a state-year cell.  
5. *** indicates significance at 99 percentile ** at 95 percentile 
6. The lowest income third in the sample distribution is characterized by annual household income <=$9337.4. 
7. All regressions include controls for the following household demographics: family size, before-tax income, urban status, number of 
persons less than 18 and over 64, the sex, race, and educational attainment of the household head. All regressions also include controls 
for state, year, month of year, and state cigarette, beer, and gasoline tax levels and monthly state unemployment rate. 




Weekly Ln Lotto Sales per Adult as a Function of Game Attributes 
dep var: 
ln(pasales) 
  (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)   
                  
Expected value    .377 
(.406) 
  .683 
(.136) 
***  .757 
(.126) 
***  .299 
(.060) 
***  .346 
(.060) 
*** 
Variance/1M.    .040 
(.010) 
***  .003 
(.006) 
  -.006 
(.004) 
  .010 
(.001) 
***  .004 
(.002) 
** 
skewness /1T    -.0002 
(.00005) 
***  .000008 
(.00004) 
  .00003 
(.00003) 
  -.00004 
(.00001) 





 -    -    .007 
(.002) 
*** -   .004 
(.0008) 
*** 
no. draws per week   -    -.059 
(.024) 
**  -.052 
(.024) 
** -    -   
age of game   -    -.133 
(.041) 
***  -.126 
(.041) 
***  -.201 
(.076) 




2   -    .020 
(.004) 
***  .020 
(.004) 
***  .022 
(.003) 
***  .023 
(.003) 
*** 
pick 5   -    .828 
(.154) 
***  .785 
(.155) 
*** -    -   
pick 6   -    .398 
(.151) 
***  .401 
(.149) 
*** -    -   
pick 7   -    .857 
(.182) 
***  .823 
(.177) 
*** -    -   
cash jackpot   -    -1.13 
(.149) 
***  -1.11 
(.143) 
*** -    -   
choice (cash/ann)   -    .290 
(.156) 
*  .214 
(.157) 
 -   -   
state 
unemployment rate 
  -.030 
(.025) 
  -.029 
(.019) 
  -.030 
(.019) 
  -.029 
(.015) 





  no   no  no  yes  yes   
state fixed effects    yes   yes  yes  yes   yes   
week fixed effects    yes   yes  yes  yes   yes   
demog. controls*    yes   yes  yes  yes   yes   
constant    -380.8 
(142.9) 
***  25.1 
(75.2) 
  11.7 
(72.9) 
  -129.1 
(66.7) 
  -127.7 
(66.8) 
* 
sample size   14,669 
 
 13,930  13,930  13,930   14,669   
R
2    .61   .89  .89  .92   .91   
notes:  
1. Unit of observation is state-week-game.  
2. The sample includes 91 lotto products from 33 states. 
3. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state-year level, to flexibly account for correlations among errors.  
4. Lottery sales data are from Lefleurs inc.  
5. Data on game characteristics is compiled by author using information provided by state lottery associations.  
6. Monthly state unemployment data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
7. All regressions are population weighted. All regressions control for the proportion of the state population in the 
following categories: females age 18-24, 25-44, 45-64, 64+, males age 18-24, 25-44, 65+. Yearly state population 
figures are from the U.S. Census Bureau.  
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Appendix Table 1 
State Lottery Implementation, by Year 
 
1964 New  Hampshire 
1967 New  York 
 
1970 New  Jersey 
1972  Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania 
1973   Maryland 





1982  District of Columbia, Washington 
1983 Colorado 
1985  California, Iowa, Oregon 
1986  Missouri, West Virginia 
1987  Montana, Kansas, South Dakota 
1988  Virginia, Florida, Wisconsin 





1993 Nebraska,  Georgia 
1996 New  Mexico 
  




Appendix Table 2 
Lottery Sales (in Year 2000 Dollars) 
 
  Mean state sales  All states 






No. of states 
(inc. DC) with 
lotteries 
No. of states 
reporting 
sales 
Overall  78.8 18.3  33,409  -   - 
1992  67.8 16.0  24,207  35  32 
1993  80.8 17.5  31,574  37  34 
1994  86.3 18.9  34,158  37  33 
1995  78.1 18.9  34,671  37  37 
1996  81.0 18.5  34,981  38  36 
1997  78.7 18.3  34,951  38  37 
1998  77.1 18.9  34,287  38  38 
          
notes:  
1. Lottery sales data is from Lefleurs inc., who collects information from state lottery agencies. 
2. Population figures used for per adult calculations are BLS census population numbers.  
3. These figures reflect sales on all lottery games, including lotto, multi-state lotto, numbers, instant, keno, sports, 
bingo, and VLT products. 
 
 